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INTRODUCTION
The red shrimp, Aristeus antennatus (Risso,
1816), is one of the most important resources for the
bottom-trawl fleets in the northwestern
Mediterranean, in terms of both landings and eco-
nomic value (Demestre and Lleonart, 1993;
Demestre and Martin, 1993; Maynou et al., 2006).
One of the ports obtaining the highest yields in the
area is that of Blanes (Irazola et al., 1996; Bas,
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SUMMARY: Red shrimp, Aristeus antennatus (Risso, 1816) is one of the most important resources for the bottom-trawl
fleets in the northwestern Mediterranean, in terms of both landings and economic value. A simple bioeconomic model intro-
ducing Game Theory for the prediction of effort dynamics at vessel level is proposed. The game is performed by the twelve
vessels exploiting red shrimp in Blanes. Within the game, two solutions are performed: non-cooperation and cooperation.
The first is proposed as a realistic method for the prediction of individual effort strategies and the second is used to illustrate
the potential profitability of the analysed fishery. The effort strategy for each vessel is the number of fishing days per year
and their objective is profit maximisation, individual profits for the non-cooperative solution and total profits for the coop-
erative one. In the present analysis, strategic conflicts arise from the differences between vessels in technical efficiency
(catchability coefficient) and economic efficiency (defined here). The ten-year and 1000-iteration stochastic simulations per-
formed for the two effort solutions show that the best strategy from both an economic and a conservationist perspective is
homogeneous effort cooperation. However, the results under non-cooperation are more similar to the observed data on effort
strategies and landings. 
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RESUMEN: DINÁMICA DE ESFUERZO EN UN MODELO BIOECONÓMICO PESQUERO: APROXIMACIÓN A NIVEL DE BARCO A TRAVÉS DE
TEORÍA DE JUEGOS. – La gamba rosada, Aristeus antennatus (Risso, 1816) es uno de los más importantes recursos para las flo-
tas de arrastre de fondo del Mediterráneo noroccidental, tanto en términos de capturas como de valor económico. Se propo-
ne un modelo bioeconómico simple que introduce la Teoría de Juegos para la predicción de dinámicas de esfuerzo pesque-
ro a nivel de barco. El juego se presenta entre doce barcos que explotan la gamba rosada en Blanes. Se presentan dos solu-
ciones dentro del juego: no cooperación y cooperación. La primera se propone como método realista para la predicción de
estrategias de esfuerzo pesquero a nivel individual, mientras que la segunda permite ilustrar el potencial de beneficios de la
pesquería. La estrategia de esfuerzo pesquero de cada barco es el número de días en el mar durante un año, y se asume que
su objetivo es maximizar beneficios, individuales para el caso no cooperativo y totales para el caso cooperativo. En el aná-
lisis que se presenta los conflictos estratégicos entre los barcos son resultado de las diferencias en su eficiencia técnica (coe-
ficiente de capturabilidad) y su eficiencia económica (definida en el trabajo). Las proyecciones estocásticas de diez años y
1000 iteraciones para las dos soluciones de esfuerzo demuestran que la mejor estrategia, tanto a nivel económico como con-
servacionista, es la cooperación. Los resultados bajo la condición de no cooperación se asemejan mejor a la realidad obser-
vada en datos de estrategia de esfuerzo y desembarcos.
Palabras clave: dinámica de esfuerzo, teoría de juegos, bioeconomía pesquera, modelos de simulación, gamba rosada,
Mediterráneo Noroccidental.
2006). The bottom-trawl fleet of Blanes is com-
posed of twelve vessels that operate near the Blanes
submarine canyon from 400 to 800 m depth
(Demestre and Lleonart, 1993; Demestre and
Martin, 1993; Bas et al., 2003). Recent studies on
population dynamics and assessments of Spanish
Mediterranean stocks of A. antennatus (Carbonell et
al., 1999; Carbonell et al., 2003) have shown that
this species is slightly overexploited. The data series
of red shrimp landings at Blanes port report values
around 60 t annually from 1997 to 2004. 
Exploitation of renewable resources such as fish
stocks shared by a limited number of agents intro-
duces the so-called stock externality (Mesterton-
Gibbons, 1993; Grønbæk, 2000) and strategic inter-
actions are consequently involved (Hannesson,
1997). Game Theory is a formal tool for analysing
the strategic interactions between a finite number of
agents sharing an exploited resource (Sumaila,
1997). Strategic interaction in fisheries is interpret-
ed as the way in which the harvest by one agent
highly affects the fishing strategy of other agents
(Grønbæk, 2000). Game Theoretic models have
been applied to different cases in fisheries, such as
equilibrium global models with symmetrical agents
(Hannesson, 1997), dynamic age-structured models
in fleet conflicts (Sumaila, 1997), countries sharing
migratory species (Arnason et al., 1999), and suit-
ability of cooperative and non-cooperative behav-
iours in the management of shared fisheries
(Hannesson, 1995).
These previous works on Game Theory applied
to fisheries assumed that fleets or countries were the
main decision makers (agents or players). However,
it is reported that the Mediterranean fisheries have
some particularities (see e.g. Lleonart and Maynou,
2003 for a recent review) that make it necessary to
conduct the economic analysis at vessel level for the
correct assessment and management of the
resources (Lleonart and Maynou, 2003; Lleonart et
al., 2003). The model proposed here aims to deter-
mine the effort strategy adopted by each vessel
under two assumptions: i) each vessel strives to
maximise its profits for the non-cooperative solu-
tion, and ii) vessels maximise overall profits for the
cooperative solution. We propose that differences
among individual vessels are reflected in their catch-
ability and costs of activity. 
The bioeconomic model includes some
Mediterranean particularities, such as the economic
balance that includes the part for the owner and the
income from secondary species (Lleonart et al.,
2003). Secondary species are expressed as a pool of
by-catch that adds significant economic revenue to
the fleet. Data series from the Blanes Fishers’
Association allowed us to estimate the empirical
relationship of secondary and target species land-
ings. The annual revenues from secondary species
were equivalent to the revenues from red shrimp in
the analysed case study. An average price of the sec-
ondary species is also estimated. 
Non-cooperative and cooperative solutions
reflect the fishermen’s behaviour in making deci-
sions. For the former, we assumed that each fisher-
man strives to maximise his profits with an individ-
ual effort strategy. It is assumed that there is no
agreement between the players and that their behav-
iour is “self-regarding” (Camerer and Fehr, 2006).
For the latter, some agreement between the fisher-
men is considered. The players agree to maximise
the profits from the exploitation subject to some
conditions. The agreement in our case is related to
the application of the same effort level by each fish-
erman. In both solutions the profits for each vessel
will thus be related to their individual costs of fish-
ing and their catchability coefficient.
Cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours are
compared with real target species landings and
effort data. This paper therefore has two main objec-
tives: i) to test a non-cooperative game as a realistic
approach to Mediterranean fisheries, and ii) to com-
pare the profitability of a Mediterranean fishery
under cooperation and non-cooperation. All the
analyses were carried out with realistic constraints
for the minimum and maximum effort levels.
MATERIAL AND METHODS
The model
The description of the model is divided into four
parts: The profits, the population dynamics, the
dynamics of catchability and the construction of the
game.
The profits
Individual profits are the evaluation function for
the non-cooperative solution, while the sum of the
individual profits is the evaluation function for the
cooperative solution. A simple bioeconomic model
SCI. MAR., 71(3), September 2007, 537-550. ISSN: 0214-8358
538 • G. MERINO et al.
is constructed by balancing the revenues from the
sale of the product and the costs, and relying upon
the level of the biomass Bt whose dynamics are
described. For each fisherman, the net profits (πv) at
time t are:
(1)
where p is the constant price of target species, yv,t is
the catch of the target species per vessel v at time t,
ps is the constant price of secondary species, ysv,t is
the catch of secondary species and Cv,t is the total
cost for each vessel v at time t. The catch of target
species by vessel v is given by (Schaefer, 1954): 
(2)
This model describes the catch of target species of a
vessel as a function of its catchability coefficient qv,t,
its effort strategy fv,t at each time and the available
biomass of the exploited stock Bt. The catchability
coefficient qv,t is the mortality generated by each
vessel with a unit of effort at each time interval and
its dynamics are explained later. The yield of sec-
ondary species in time t for each vessel (ysv,t), fol-
lowing Lleonart et al. (2003), is related linearly to
the target species landings as:
(3)
where μ is the catch of secondary species in the
absence of target species and υ is the catch of sec-
ondary species for each catch unit of target species.
These parameters are estimated empirically using
the data from the Fishermen’s Association and are
considered to be the same for the entire fleet. The
assumption of the secondary species equation
implies accepting that its population dynamics is lin-
early related to that of the target species. This sim-
plification arises from the need to consider the
income from secondary species that balances the
actual income obtained by each vessel, while avoid-
ing building population dynamics models for each
bycatch species. 
The costs of the activity are divided into three: cv
is the cost of unit of effort of a vessel v; fixedv, are
the annual fixed costs for a vessel v (insurances,
license and other fixed costs); comm are the sales
commissions (commercialisation costs). 
Combining Equations 1 and 3 and introducing
the owner’s share of the profits and the costs struc-
ture, the profits per vessel v at time unit t are:
(4)
where (1–g) is the owner’s share of the profits. 
Stock dynamics
Players (vessel owners) in the game are jointly
constrained by the dynamics of the target species
stock. “What one user appropriates is unavailable to
other users” (Oakerson, 1992). We assume that we
have N (later on N=12) vessels exploiting the fish
stock that is considered their common property
(Hardin, 1968; Grønbæk, 2000): a single stock
exploited by N vessels sharing a fishery. The dynam-
ics of the stock are described by the Schaefer’s
(1954) surplus production model:
(5)
(6)
where r represents the intrinsic growth rate of the
stock, K represents the carrying capacity, N repre-
sents the number of vessels exploiting the main
stock, Yt is the total catch of the target stock at time
t, and yv,t is the catch of the target species of vessel v
at time t (Eq. 2).
The biomass dynamics was modelled using the
difference equation (Hilborn and Walters, 1992) for
10000 time steps and the bioeconomic loop was com-
pleted at each time step. However, the results were
produced at year level, summing the results of the
10000 time steps included in a year (Merino, 2006). 
The target stock variations can be modelled by
Equation 5, taking into account that Yt, the sum of
the catches of target species by all the vessels at
each time step, can be written as a function of the
efforts by means of Equation 7, derived from
Equations 2 and 6.
(7)
The time horizon for the dynamic game is 10
years, and the evolution over time is easily predict-
ed, with a dynamics for the catchability coefficient
qv,t (Eqs. 8a, b, c) and a set of effort strategies, fv,t.
The estimation of the initial biomass B0 and the bio-
logical parameters is explained below (see
Parameter estimation).
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The dynamics of the catchability coefficient
The catchability coefficient of a vessel v at time
t is defined as the mortality generated in the target
species by one unit of fishing effort by vessel v. It is
described by Equation 8a, where λ is the annual rate
of catchability increase. 
(8a)
The solution of the differential equation is Eq. 8.b,
with the initial condition qv,t0, the catchability coeffi-
cient at time 0 for vessel v.
(8b)
A discretisation was made for the catchability
dynamics, where catchability is assemed constant
throughout the year and increased every time interval
τ (yearly). It can be approximated by Equation 8c. 
(8c)
The Game
The effort strategies simulate two different behav-
iours: non-cooperation and cooperation. In the first
case, where fishermen are supposed to maximise their
own benefits without considering any cooperation
other than the residual information related to their
activity and characteristics, Nash’s non-cooperative
solution was found (Nash, 1951). For the second case,
a constrained cooperative solution was used, with the
condition that all fishermen apply the same effort, i.e.
each fisherman fishes for the same number of days. 
Non-cooperation
The non-cooperative solution concept is pro-
posed in the present document as a realistic method
for predicting effort dynamics in Mediterranean
fisheries. It allows us to simulate the effort to be
made by each vessel owner.
The biomass of the stock follows the dynamics
described in Equation 5, starting from the estimated
initial biomass B0. The aim of the calculations under
the non-equilibrium assumption is to fix a ten-year
fishing effort strategy for each vessel, and it will con-
sider that this strategy is constant over time (fv,t = fv).
The aim of this hypothesis is to avoid ideal solutions
of infinite intervals, i.e. not leading the system to a
short-term analysis in which profits would be max-
imised by removing all the stocks from the ecosys-
tem. Moreover, the observations on this fishery allow
us to assert that vessel owners design their plans for
an average period of about ten years (Esgleas, pers
comm.). Some authors (Sumaila, 1999; Grønbæk,
2000) have noted that the assumption of constant
strategy can likewise be used due to the difficulties of
computing dynamic strategies. In the present study,
the effort solutions represent an attempt to describe
the usual fishing behaviour of the vessels, i.e. they
describe vessels as intense, medium or occasional
exploiters of the analysed stock. Some heterogeneity
in vessel characteristics and fishing behaviour is
reported in Mediterranean fisheries (Lleonart and
Maynou, 2003; Merino, 2006).
As noted above, the profit of each owner depends
upon his own effort strategy, but also upon the
strategies of the other owners. Hence, we are faced
with an N-player (the N vessel owners), non-zero
sum game (Luce and Raiffa, 1989; Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1991; Basar and Olsder, 1999). The solution
concept used is the Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1951),
defined as a set of strategies satisfying that each
player’s strategy is the best response to the equilib-
rium strategies of the others. It provides us with
strategies such that none of the players will benefit
from unilateral deviation. The effort strategies vec-
tor (f1*, f2*, f3*, f4*, … fN*) will be called a Nash equi-
librium if the following expression holds true:
(9a)
where eδt is the discount rate. 
Equation 9 provides us with actions such that
none of the players will benefit from unilateral devi-
ation (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991; Basar and
Olsder, 1999).
Some constraints are included in the form:
fmin ≤ fv* ≤ fmax
For the purpose of the analysis, fmin =0 and
fmax=240 days. The maximum effort level of 240
days is proposed as a realistic constraint derived
from the regulation of Spanish Mediterranean fish-
eries, where fishing is permitted only from Monday
to Friday with the exception of public holidays.
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According to these assumptions, once the agents
reach the effort strategy given by Equation 9, they
have no incentive to deviate from that choice (Luce
and Raiffa, 1989).
Nash’s non-cooperative solutions were obtained
with a successive approximation method to itera-
tively approximate solutions for the twelve equilib-
rium equations. 
Cooperation 
Agents playing a cooperative strategy act jointly
as a single harvester maximising aggregated profits
(Grønbæk, 2000). A cooperative game is one in which
players are able to make enforceable contracts (Shor,
accessed 2006). The cooperation concept with Nash’s
bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) implies the maximi-
sation of the whole fishery with some constraint relat-
ed to the bargain between the agents (Sumaila, 1997).
If the agents sharing a common resource have identi-
cal management goals, the optimisation problem is
straightforward: that is, choosing the strategy as a
sole-owner and bargaining then takes place over the
division of the net economic returns (Munro, 1990;
Grønbæk, 2000). In our case, the bargain is related to
the amount of effort to apply. Vessel owners decide to
maximise the income from the fishery by applying
the same effort, which is more realistic according to
the Mediterranean management structure, where
effort is regulated with maximum days allowed for
fishing and fishermen’s associations may act as single
agents. The agreement is thus reached before the
maximisation of the economic return and it acts as a
constraint to that maximisation. It accounts for the
strategic interactions between fishermen, as differ-
ences in vessels will bring different profits to each
one. It may be stated that the decision is first reached
on effort shares and attention is then turned to max-
imising profits. Realistically, this simulates that fish-
ermen, aggregated in the Fishermen’s Association,
make the decision with this constraint. We may call
this cooperative solution “a homogeneous strategy
cooperative solution” (Eq. 10). 
A minimum and a maximum effort level are
defined again. 
(10)
and .
The cooperative solutions were obtained with the
genetic algorithm pikaia (Charbonneau, 2002) for
global maximisation.
The data
Landings and effort data series from 1997-
2004 at vessel level were provided by the Blanes
Fishermen’s Association and were used to esti-
mate the catchability coefficients of each vessel
and the biological parameters of target species
and their relation to secondary species. 
The technical description of the vessels and
their economic parameters (including fuel con-
sumption, insurance, variable costs and other
daily costs) were obtained during the COCTEL
project (“Analysis of the Mediterranean (includ-
ing North Africa) deep-sea shrimp fishery:
Catches, effort and economics”, European
Commission DG XIV) (Sardá, 2000; Maynou et
al., 2006) and were used here to calculate the
cost of unit of effort as well as fixed costs for
every vessel. The technical and economic charac-
teristics of an average vessel of the fleet are pre-
sented in Table 1. Economic parameters such as
the price of red shrimp and fuel, together with the
costs and revenue structures, which includes a
share system to pay the workers’ wages, sales
commissions and revenues from secondary
species, were obtained during the BEMMFISH
project (“Bio-economic modelling of Mediterra-
nean Fisheries”, European Commission DG
FISH) and are also shown in Table 1.
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TABLE 1. – Economic and technical parameters for the Blanes trawl-
ing fleet targeting red shrimp (Aristeus antennatus). Estimated from 
(Sardá, 2000) and (Merino, 2006).
Fuel consumption (l/day) 116.8
Trawlers’ average fuel consumption 1116.8 l/day
Trawlers’ average gross tonnage 87 t
Trawlers’ average fixed costs 59473 euro/year
Trawlers’ average cost of effort unit 335.2 euro /day  
Price of target species (p) 29.75 euro/kg  
Price of secondary species (ps) 5.091 euro/kg
Secondary species for target 
landed unit (υ) 4.82 kg/kg of target sp.  
Fixed secondary species landings 
when no target landed (μ) 76342 kg
Commercialisation tax 0.07%
Part of the profits for the owner (1-g) 0.5 (50%)  
Discount factor (96%)  
Effort costs (euro/day) 335.2
Parameter estimation
Biological parameters
A series of eight years for the total landings of
red shrimp and specific effort was used to estimate
the target stock biomass the first year of the data
series B0, its intrinsic growth rate r and its carrying
capacity K, as well as the average catchability qm of
a vessel during the period of the data set, following
Prager (1994). The function to minimise is related to
the difference between observed and estimated land-
ings (Eq. 11). The minimisation was held with the
genetic algorithm gafortran (Carroll, 2001).
(11)
After fitting the model to the data series with a
constant catchability coefficient, estimation was
improved by adding dynamic catchability and tun-
ing the empirical fit of the estimation based on the
literature (Lindebo, 1999). 
Vessels catchability coefficients
Fleet’s heterogeneity is reflected by the vessels’
fishing capacity or catchability coefficient and their
fishing costs, or more exactly by their qv/cv ratio.
The biomass dynamics parameter estimation is
performed with total catch (Y) and effort (E) data
series of the target species, and as a result, fishing
mortality (F) can be expressed as:
(12)
where qm is the average catchability of a vessel of
the fleet under study. To estimate the vessels’ catch-
ability coefficients the following method was used:
The catchability of each vessel was related to the
catchability of an average vessel at initial time, mak-
ing the following assumptions for each year, and to
the landings and effort data at vessel level:
1) First, each vessel’s catch per unit effort (cpue)
of target species is related to a reference vessel,
which can be the vessel with highest cpue, for
instance vessel 1 (Eq. 13).
(13)
2) As the cpue1 and cpuev are known, we obtain
the relative ηv values that allow the relation between
vessels’ cpue. We demonstrate that the relative ηv
values between cpues are also relative differences
between catchability coefficients (Eqs. 14 and 15):
(14)
(15)
The only unknown in Equation 15 is the refer-
ence catchability parameter q1. 
3) After solving Equation 15 and obtaining q1, we
easily calculate vessel level catchability coeffi-
cients:
(16)
A similar method of vessel description or character-
isation was performed by Sparre and Willman for their
BEAM 4 model, though they relate the standardisation
of fishing effort at vessel level through differences in
fishing power (Sparre and Willman, 1993a, b). 
The uncertainty
Some uncertainty was added to the landings and
effort equations (Equations 17 and 18). Using nor-
mal and lognormal distributions of errors, the simu-
lated target species’ catch was generated by adding
noise to the Schaefer model:
(17)
The uncertainty for the non-cooperation effort solu-
tions was similarly introduced as:
(18)
where m is the slope of the linear regression relating
estimated to observed values, h1 is the mean error
observed and σ2 is the standard error. Note that after
the introduction of the uncertainty, the effort is not
necessarily constant each time interval. 
The values of these parameters for the target
species’ catch equations and for the non-cooperative
effort solutions were obtained after linear regres-
sions (see below). 
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For the cooperative solution, the uncertainty rep-
resents the impossibility of assuring that fisher-
men will fish the indicated number of days. It was
approached with an additive variability of 5%
days imposed, which is considered to be caused by
implementation uncertainty (Hauge, 2005;
Merino, 2006).
RESULTS
The first result to highlight is the parameter set
describing the population dynamics of the target
species, red shrimp, with the Schaefer’s model
(Table 2). Figures 1 and 2 show the temporal fit of
the data and the correlation between catch and cpue
estimates and observations. The slope of the function
that relates estimated to observed landings of red
shrimp was 0.9753, with a standard error of 0.04204
and a significance of p(η) <10-5.
Vessels’ catchability coefficients in 1997 and
their economic efficiency parameters are shown in
Table 3, jointly with their economic efficiency
parameters and their corresponding cooperative and
non-cooperative strategies. Non-cooperative effort
solutions are proposed as a realistic approach to the
observed effort dynamics in Mediterranean fish-
eries. Figure 3 relates the estimated individual effort
strategies to the observed average effort level of ves-
sels in the period 1997-2004. It allows vessels to be
classified into three groups: vessels that fish red
shrimp all the year, medium-intensity exploiters and
occasional exploiters. As is observed, Nash’s solu-
tions provide a suitable identification of the vessels
that fish red shrimp most frequently and the ones
that fish occasionally. The model also identifies a
group of vessels that exploit in a medium-intensity
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FIG. 1. – Fit (line) to the observed landings (points) with the esti-
mated set of biological parameters for the red shrimp landings series 
from 1997 to 2004 in Blanes. 
FIG. 2. – Observed red shrimp landings from 1997 to 2004 in Blanes
and estimated landings with parameters shown in Table 2 and the
Schaefer model. Standard error = 0.04204 and significance of 
p(η)=5.387·10-7 < 10-5.
TABLE 2. – Estimated red shrimp biological parameters (intrinsic
growth rate (r), carrying capacity (K), initial biomass at 1997 (B0)),
average catchability coefficient (q) and annual increase in catcha-
bility (λ) of the Blanes bottom-trawl fleet exploiting red shrimp.
r (days-1) K (t) B0 (t) q (day-1) λ
0.9626 327.0 75.2 0.0004805 0.03 (3%)
TABLE 3. – Catchability parameter (qv) and economic efficiency
ratios (qv/cv, mortality generated by a unit cost of effort) of the
twelve trawlers of the Blanes fleet targeting red shrimp in 1997 and
corresponding effort strategies directed at red shrimp (days at the 
sea) for cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. 
Vessel Catchability Economic  Effort of  Effort of   
(qv) efficiency non-cooperation cooperation(qv/cv)10-6 (days) (days)
v-1 0.00015 0.7 0 71
v-2 0.00086 1.52 19 71
v-3 0.00080 2.13 216 71
v-4 0.00105 2.74 240 71
v-5 0.000369 1.14 0 71
v-6 0.00115 2.25 168 71
v-7 0.00068 1.76 135 71
v-8 0.00091 3.31 240 71
v-9 0.00032 2.74 240 71
v-10 0.00119 2.41 183 71
v-11 0.00037 1.30 0 71
v-12 0.00111 2.57 215 71
Total - - 1656 852
effort strategy. Three vessels that the model esti-
mates as occasional and intense were not appropri-
ately estimated.
The R2 parameter estimation has been observed
to be controversial for the regressions crossing the
point (0, 0) (Cade and Terrell, 1997; Merino, 2006)
and is not displayed. The positive Pearson correla-
tion between the estimated and observed effort
strategies was 0.56. The statistical parameters relat-
ing observed and estimated effort strategies were
used to build the simulated effort solutions (m2 =
0.662, h2 = -15.24, ).
Simulations from 1997 to 2006 were performed
for the two solutions to compare the effects of non-
cooperative and cooperative strategies over a ten-
year horizon. The simulations were performed with
1000 iterations and the uncertainty associated with
the parameter estimation process and the effort
dynamics derived from the regressions in Figures 2
and 3 (Eqs. 17 and 18). The simulations (Figs. 4, 5,
6 and 7) are displayed through the mean and the 5
and 95% confidence intervals for all the bioeconom-
ic indicators. 
The results displayed are target species’ biomass
level, total catch, fishing mortality and discounted
profits. The non-cooperative scenario is represented
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FIG. 4. – Simulation of the global bioeconomic indicators in a non-cooperative system of the Blanes red shrimp fishery from 1997 to 2006. 
The bioeconomic variables of the activity are represented through their mean values and their 5 and 95% confidence intervals.
FIG. 3. – Observed relative effort strategies for the twelve vessels in
the Blanes red shrimp fishery and their respective non-cooperative
solutions. Note that the solution to the proposed non-cooperative
game simulates high intensity (pointed circle), mid intensity (dotted
lined circle) and occasional (lined circle) fishermen targeting red 
shrimp. Pearson coefficient = 0.56.
with the simulations in Figures 4 (total level) and 5
(vessel level). Figure 4 shows a slight recovery of
the population due to a predicted slight decrease in
effort. The population is simulated to be sustained
around 70 t level, which represents 21% of its car-
rying capacity. Landings are simulated to fluctuate
around the 50 t level. Fishing mortality decreases
slightly due to this effort reduction but the constant
increase in catchability is predicted to return it to the
levels in 1997. The discounted profits of the activity
in a non-cooperative system are predicted to be
maintained initially near 0.6 M euro but constantly
decreasing due to the discount factor (Table 1).
Regarding the vessels’ economic return, it can
be observed that the expected profits are related to
the vessels’ technical characteristics. The vessels
that obtain the highest profits from the red shrimp
fishery (3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12) are those with the high-
est catchability and economic efficiency parame-
ters, with two exceptions. Vessel 2 has a high
catchability coefficient (it generates a high fishing
mortality with a unit of effort) but it has a low eco-
nomic efficiency parameter. On the other hand,
Vessel 9 is an economically very efficient vessel
(it generates a high fishing mortality for each euro
invested) but it has a low catchability coefficient.
These two vessels obtain very low profits from
their activities. To sum up, vessels’ competitive-
ness is related to both their catchability and their
economic efficiencies. 
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FIG. 5. – Simulation of the discounted profits of the twelve vessels in a non-cooperative system. Note that the vessels’ profits are related to both
their catchability and their economic efficiency coefficients. Profits of the twelve trawlers targeting red shrimp in Blanes are represented by 
their mean and their 5 and 95% confidence intervals.
The homogeneous cooperative effort scenario
(Fig. 6) would bring about a considerable reduction
in fishing effort (Table 3). This should lead to a sig-
nificant recovery in the population level, which
would reach 150 t, which represents 45% of its car-
rying capacity. Landings would initially decrease
due to the effort reduction but the population’s
recovery would bring the total landings to previous
levels in the medium term. In the long run, landings
should increase to 80 t. The increase in landings and
the reduction in the costs of the activity should lead
the overall economic profitability of the exploitation
to a medium-term equilibrium around 0.9 M euros.
At vessel level, cooperation would bring positive
results to all the vessels sharing the red shrimp
exploitation (Fig. 7). Table 4 reflects the change in
the vessels’ profits in a cooperative strategy. As it is
straightforward, all the vessels should consider the
change to a cooperative system as individually
rational (Camerer and Fehr, 2006).
The differences in the overall bioeconomic indi-
cators are displayed in Figure 8. The variables show
higher values for cooperation (black area) or for
non-cooperation (grey area) during the simulation
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FIG. 6. – Simulation of the overall bioeconomic indicators in a homogeneous effort cooperation scenario for the Blanes red shrimp fishery. 
The bioeconomic variables are represented through their mean values and their 5 and 95 % confidence intervals.
TABLE 4. – Economic return of individual vessels if homogeneous
effort cooperative strategy was adopted instead of the current non-
cooperative strategy currently described for the trawlers targeting 
red shrimp in Blanes.
Vessel Return of changing to cooperation (euro)
v-1 61388.81
v-2 494315.79
v-3 115578.30
v-4 38239.08
v-5 208598.72
v-6 316599.53
v-7 249949.01
v-8 20937.04
v-9 5600.96
v-10 249268.02
v-11 194593.27
v-12 133512.77
time. From a conservationist perspective it is obvi-
ous that cooperation allows the population to reach
secure levels and the medium-term profits are also
higher with cooperation. The cooperative behaviour
would bring higher landings and higher profits to the
activity in the medium term after the population’s
recovery (3 years).
DISCUSSION
Biological parameters are the first result obtained
in the present work and show values that are signif-
icantly different from the parameters obtained previ-
ously by other authors for the same species
(Demestre and Lleonart, 1993; Demestre and
Martin, 1993; Carbonell et al., 1999; Carbonell et
al., 2003). 
Simulations performed for non-cooperation and
homogeneous effort cooperation suggest interesting
conclusions about exploitations described as shared
resources.
Apparently, under a non-cooperative regime, the
red shrimp fishery will be sustained in a moderately
exploited situation, which is concordant with the
assessments of this species along the northwestern
Mediterranean (Sardá et al., 2003).
In the current management scheme for red
shrimp, non-cooperation would decrease the prof-
itability of the system, due to both the common
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FIG. 7. – Simulation of the discounted profits of the twelve vessels in a cooperative system. Note that the trawlers’ profits are related to both
their catchability and their economic efficiency coefficients. Profits of the twelve vessels targeting red shrimp in Blanes are represented by 
their mean and their 5 and 95% confidence intervals.
property distortion (Hardin, 1968; Arnason, 1998)
of the system and the increase in catchability or
overcapitalisation.
Non-cooperative behaviour compared
favourably with the observed data (Fig. 3) and,
under the assumption of non-cooperation, profits
would show a slight but constant decrease.
Maximum economic income over a ten-year
period is reached under cooperative behaviour. The
characterisation of the fleet at vessel level showed
the differences in economic efficiency between the
vessels. This characterisation has been demonstrated
to be necessary for the prediction of effort dynamics
and profitability estimates for decision making relat-
ed to both investments in technology (increase of q)
and reducing costs (c). 
The fishery is subsidised, with effort subsidies
(exemption of fuel tax, which means that the fuel
price paid by fishermen is around 50% of the retail
price) introducing a distortion in the system
(Arnason, 1998). As a consequence, it is not possi-
ble to say whether the fishery could regulate the
effort adequately to the resource. The current regu-
lation may be described as non-cooperative behav-
iour with the constraints of no fishing during week-
ends and public holidays. Moreover, climatologic
conditions also constrain the number of fishing
days. Our results agree with those of other authors
who state that cooperation is the economically best
management regime and with theoretical results on
the management of shared resources (Hardin, 1968;
Munro, 1979; Sumaila, 1997).
The individualisation of the decision to establish
an effort strategy appears to be a good tool for pre-
dicting the evolution of the system under any new
regulation proposed for the optimisation of the sys-
tem. Research under these assumptions is an open
field, in which the results of completely liberalising
the effort strategies with no subsidies or the decision
to leave the fishery may be investigated. 
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FIG. 8. – Mean values of the bioeconomic indicators of the Blanes red shrimp fishery under cooperative and non-cooperative behaviours. The
grey and the black areas represent the difference between the values in a non-cooperative and cooperative regime in the bioeconomic 
indicators. In grey, values that are higher in the non-cooperative scheme; in black, values that are higher in the cooperative scheme. 
CONCLUSIONS
Our study has shown that there are vessel level
management options for improving the long-term
regulation of red shrimp (Aristeus antennatus) trawl
fisheries. The method presented can be used to char-
acterise the fleet with catch and effort data for the
target species at vessel level. A management option
based on cooperation would help to maximise the
profits generated by the resource and to conserve the
target species. Nevertheless, the analysed fleet’s
effort dynamics are suitably approximated with a
non-cooperative scheme.
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